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BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant , Kip Roland Parken, was charged with t h e f t , a 
t h i r d degi.ee f e l o n y , in v i o l a t i o n of Utah Code Ann. § 7 6 - 6 - 4 0 4 
(1978) and § 7 6 - 6 - 4 1 2 ( 1 9 7 8 ) . 
Defendant was c o n v i c t e d of the l e s s e r but inc luded 
o f f e n s e of a t tempted t h e f t , a c l a s s A misdemeanor i n a jury t r i a l 
he ld December 1 1 , 1 9 8 5 , in t h e F i f t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t Court, in 
and for Washington County, S t a t e of Utah, the Honorable J . Harlan 
Burns, Judge, p r e s i d i n g . Defendant was s en tenced by Judge Burns 
on January 1 3 , 1986, t o 364 days in the County J a i l , the 
e x e c u t i o n of the sentence was s t a y e d and t h e defendant was p laced 
on p r o b a t i o n for one y e a r . 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In t h e proceed ings below, defendant and t h e S t a t e 
seemed t o agree tha t c e r t a i n e v e n t s took p l a c e . Both defendant 
and wi tnesses for the State t e s t i f i e d that defendant, who l i v e d 
in Nephi, Utah, t r a v e l l e d to S t . George, Utah, on February 26, 
1986 (R. 106, 150 ) . Defendant drove to S t . George in a GMC 
pickup truck belonging t o h is grandfather, for the purpose of 
engaging in construct ion work. 
When he arrived at S t . George, defendant ran in to K.C. 
Coombs, an old schoolmate of h i s from Nephi, who inv i t ed 
derendant to stay with him in h i s apartment (R. 106, 1 5 1 ) . 
Between the evening of the 26th and the night of the 29th, 
defendant and Coombs spent a number of hours driving through the 
ranching country of Washington County in the GMC pickup (R. 76-
79 , 109, 154-56) . At one point on the afternoon of the 27th, 
they drove slowly past an area near the Arizona border, where 
rancher LeMoyne Esplin of St . George was herding about 50 head of 
c a t t l e into some corrals (R. 7 8 , 156) . Sometime between 11:30 
that night and 1:00 the fol lowing morning, defendant and Coombs 
returned and loaded s i x of the c a t t l e belonging to Mr. Esplin 
in to the GMC pickup (R. 80, 1 6 3 ) . At a 7-Eleven s tore in 
Washington, they f i l l e d the truck with gas (R. 81 , 162) . They 
then drove along back roads through Hurricane and onto the 1-15 
freeway (R. 81 , 162-63) . 
At aoout 2:00 a.m., defendant and Coombs arrived at a 
c a t t l e auction yard in Cedar City (R. 114, 164) . There was no 
one e l s e present at the auction yard, and the two men unloaded 
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the Esplin c a t t l e and herded them into a s t a l l (R. 114, 164) A 
Defendant and Coombs drove back to St . George. And a few hours 
la ter , at about daybreak, they returned to Cedar City in a car 
owned by Coombs (R. 87, 166-67). They spent the morning at the 
auction yard waiting for the c a t t l e to be sold. In the 
afternoon, Coombs was given a check for $1,462.25, from the sale 
of seven c a t t l e (R. 119, S t a t e ' s e x h i b i t ' s 8-10). Coombs cashed 
the check a t a bank in Cedar City, gave defendant $130, and they 
returned to St . George (R. 88, 167-70). 
There appears t o have been no dispute as to the 
occurrence of the foregoing events . The issue at t r i a l was 
whether defendant was aware tha t he and Coombs were taking the 
c a t t l e without the owner's permission. Defendant claimed tha t he 
had driven with Coombs through the ranching areas of Washington 
County, only because Coombs had said tha t he had wanted to show 
defendant where he had par t ic ipa ted in motorcycle d i r t -b ike 
racing (R. 154-55) . Defendant claimed tha t he had no idea, as 
they drove slowly past the Esplin co r r a l s , that Coombs had any 
plans to s tea l c a t t l e (R. 156) . He stated tha t he had ass i s ted 
Coombs in loading the c a t t l e and taking them to Cedar City 
believing tha t the c a t t l e belonged to a friend of Coombs and tha t 
the friend had authorized Coombs to take them (R. 159). 
Defendant claimed tha t he did not become suspicious tha t the 
1 Mr. Coombs t e s t i f i e d t h a t , when they arrived at the auction 
yard, they saw a cow running loose in the yard. The two men 
captured the cow and placed i t in the s t a l l with the other six 
(R. 85). Records kept by the auction yard es tabl ished that 
Coombs was indeed paid for the sale of seven c a t t l e (S t a t e ' s 
exh ib i t s 8-10). 
- 3 -
c a t t l e were s to len , un t i l he saw that the check from the auction 
yard was made out to Mr. Coombs (R. 167-68). 
The Sta te cal led K.C. Coombs whose story was much 
di f ferent than defendant ' s . Coombs t e s t i f i e d t h a t , while they 
were driving through the ranching lands of Washington County, he 
to ld defendant his plan to s t ea l c a t t l e and s e l l them at an 
auction (R. 77) . Defendant agreed to pa r t i c ipa t e in the scheme 
and expressed a des i re tha t they be careful , because he was on 
probation from an e a r l i e r conviction and could not afford to be 
caught (R. 82-84). Coombs said that they drove through ranching 
areas for four to five hours, and defendant helped him to look 
for c a t t l e tha t were heavyset and did not have obvious branding 
marks (R. 83-a5 f 109). Coombs said t h a t he gave defendant 
$250.00 for his pa r t i c ipa t ion in the theft—$130.00 on the day of 
the auction, and the remaining amount during the following week 
(R. 88). 
In cross-examining defendant, the Sta te pointed to a 
number of factors suggesting that defendant was not a r e l i a b l e 
witness and tha t h is story was not c red ib le . Defendant admitted, 
for example, tha t he had been convicted of a crime of dishonesty, 
forgery (R. 177). Defendant himself had t e s t i f i e d tha t he and 
Coombs had driven slowly past the Esplin cor ra l s on February 
27th, and the S ta te pointed out how unlikely i t was t h a t , in 
taking c a t t l e from those same cor ra l s on the night of that same 
day, defendant could have been unaware tha t he was taking c a t t l e 
without the owner's permission (R. 178-79). Defendant further 
conceded tha t the taking had occurred l a t e at night and tha t they 
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had followed obscure back roads to reach their des t inat ion (R. 
179) . 
Having heard the evidence, the jury returned a verdict 
of gu i l ty to s i x counts of attempted theft (R. 111-16)• 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant f a i l e d to object to the jury ins truct ion on 
attempted thef t and thus i s precluded from arguing on appeal that 
the jury could not find him g u i l t y of attempted t h e f t . Further, 
such an ins truc t ion i s not of such nature so as t o j u s t i f y 
invoKing the plain error ru le . 
Assuming defendant had timely objected, the ins truct ion 
on attempt was properly given s ince one can be convicted of 
attempt although an act i s consummated. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT'S FAILURE TO OBJECT AT TRIAL TO 
THE JURY INSTRUCTION ON ATTEMPT PRECLUDES 
HIS CHALLENGING IT FOR THE FIRST TIME ON 
APPEAL. 
Defendant argues tha t , because the only real issue 
before the jury was whether he had the intent to s t ea l the c a t t l e 
that he took from the Esplin corra l s , h i s convict ion of attempted 
thef t i s incons i s t en t with his being acquitted of actual t h e f t . 
Derendant urges that h i s convict ion on the attempt counts must 
therefore be reversed. 
Because defendant never challenged the jury ins truct ion 
- 5 -
on attempt2 t h i s issue i s not properly before t h i s Court. 
Defendant, in effect , urges tha t his s t ra tegy at t r i a l was "a l l 
or nothing," i . e . , tha t he was e i ther gu i l ty of theft or not 
gui l ty of any crime. His f a i lu re to challenge the jury 
ins t ruc t ion on attempted the f t , however, be l ies t h i s clciim. Even 
though he admitted t o a l l of the elements of thef t except i n t en t , 
defendant could s t i l l have hoped for conviction of a lesser crime 
if the jury thought him gu i l t y . If defendant did not hope for 
such leniency, then he could have objected to t h i s jury 
ins t ruc t ion on the basis he now ra i s e s on appeal—that the 
evidence did not support acqu i t t a l of the greater crime and 
conviction of the l e s s e r . 
Prior to the j u r y ' s de l ibera t ion at t r i a l , Judge Burns 
asked defense counsel whether he had any objection to the 
i n s t ruc t ions to be given the ju ry . Counsel for defendant 
objected tha t two of h is requested i n s t ruc t i ons , unrelated to the 
present i ssue , had not been given (R. 220-22) . "Other than 
t h a t , " counsel s t a t ed , "I have no exception to the i n s t r u c t i o n s , 
Your Honor." (R. 222). The jury was then ins t ruc ted t ha t i t 
could find defendant gui l ty of the f t , gui l ty of attempted the f t , 
or not gui l ty (R. 97, 110). Only after the jury rendered i t s 
verd ic t of gui l ty on the attempted theft counts did defendant 
complain t ha t the jury should not have been allowed to find him 
gui l ty of attempted theft (R. 233). 
2 The ins t ruc t ion on attempt i s provided in addendum A of t h i s 
br ief . 
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Defendant's f a i l u r e to timely object below to the 
ins truct ion given precludes h i s ra i s ing the i s sue for the f i r s t 
time on appeal. See Utah R. Crim. P. 19(c) , Utah Code Ann. § 77-
35-19(c) (1982); State v. Noren, 704 P.2d 568, 571 (Utah 1985) 
( f a i l u r e to object to ins truc t ion at t r i a l precludes challenge on 
appeal) ; State v. Bare l la , 714 P.2d 287, 288 (Utah 1986) 
(appellant must indicate from the record that he made a proper 
object ion below); State v. S t e g g e l l , 660 P.2d 252, 254 (Utah 
1983) (court w i l l not consider i s sues raised for the f i r s t time 
on appeal); State v. Valdez, 605 P.2d 472
 f 272 (Utah 1979) 
( ins truct ions not objected to at t r i a l cannot be raised for f i r s t 
time on appeal ) . 
Nor i s the issue raised of such a nature or magnitude 
so as to j u s t i f y invoking the p la in error r u l e . Utah R. Crim. P. 
1 9 ( c ) , Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-19(c) (1982). T^e ins truct ion did 
not misstate the lawf thus warranting review by t h i s Court. See 
State v. Les ley , 672 P.2d 79 (Utah 1983) . Further, i t i s not 
plain error for the court to g ive a l e s s e r included offense 
i n s t r u c t i o n , even over a defendant's objec t ion , i f warranted by 
the evidence and there i s c l ear ly no risk that the defendant w i l l 
be prejudiced by lack of notice and preparation so as t o deprive 
him of a f u l l and fa ir opportunity to defend himself . S ta te v. 
Howeil, 649 P.2d 91 (Utah 1982) . Because an attempt i s 
necessar i ly included in every completed of fense , defendant was 
not prejudiced by the ins truc t ion on attempt. Since defendant 
f a i l e d to object to t h i s ins truc t ion at t r i a l , t h i s Court should 
not consider t h i s issue on appeal. 
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POINT II 
ASSUMING DEFENDANT HAD OBJECTED, THE ATTEMPT 
INSTRUCTION WAS NOT IMPROPER. 
Assuming defendant had t i m e l y o b j e c t e d t o t h e 
i n s t r u c t i o n on a t t empt , t h i s i n s t r u c t i o n was not improper. 
Defendant argues t h a t a c o n v i c t i o n for an attempt cannot s tand 
"unles s t h e r e i s i n t e n t t o commit a crime and an i n e f f e c t i v e act 
done toward i t s commiss ion ." Br i e f of a p p e l l a n t a t 1 0 . 
D e t e n d a n t ' s argument t h a t t h e act done toward t h e in tended crime 
must be i n e f f e c t i v e i s untenab le i n l i g h t of Utah Code Ann. § 7 6 -
4 - 1 0 1 ( 3 ) (197b) , which s p e c i f i c a l l y s t a t e s , "No de fense t o t h e 
o f f e n s e of attempt s h a l l a r i s e : (a) because the o f f e n s e 
a t tempted was a c t u a l l y committed . . . ." See a l s o S t a t e v . 
Garnick , 619 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1 9 8 0 ) . 
Defendant f u r t h e r argues t h a t t h e jury v e r d i c t was 
i l l o g i c a l s i n c e the defendant admit ted t o committ ing a l l of the 
e l ement s of t h e f t except i n t e n t and s i n c e the jury found 
defendant not g u i l t y of t h e f t , t h e jury must n e c e s s a r i l y have 
found t h a t defendant d id not p o s s e s s t h e r e q u i s i t e i n t e n t for 
a t tempted t h e f t . 
This Court r e c e n t l y s t a t e d in S t a t e v . S t e w a r t , 33 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 15 (May 1 , 1 9 8 6 ) : 
That the v e r d i c t may have been a r e s u l t of 
compromise, or of a mis take on the part of 
t h e jury i s p o s s i b l e . But v e r d i c t s cannot 
be upset by s p e c u l a t i o n or inqu iry i n t o 
such m a t t e r s . 
I d . at 1 6 , c i t i n g Dunn v . United S t a t e s , 294 U.S. 390 ( 1 9 3 2 ) . In 
S t e w a r t , four inmates of the Utah S t a t e P r i s o n were charged with 
second degree muraer in t h e s tabb ing death of a f e l l o w p r i s o n e r . 
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Two of the four inmates, Stewart and Christensen f were convicted, 
while the other two, Coleman and Dominquez, wete acqui t ted . On 
appeal to t h i s Court, Stewart and Christensen argued tha t the i r 
convictions should be reversed on the ground that the convictions 
were inconsis tent with the acqu i t t a l s of Coleman and Dominquez. 
This Court declared that the issue was not whether the verd ic t s 
were cons is tent , but "simply whether there was suff ic ient 
evidence to support the gui l ty v e r d i c t s . " Xd. a t 15. 
Although the issue in t h i s case i s not one per taining 
to inconsistency of ve rd i c t s , the reasoning behind many cour ts 1 
refusal to set aside inconsis tent verd ic t s i s applicable to the 
ins tant case. 
Courts refuse to inval ida te convictions on grounds tha t 
they are incons is ten t with other verd ic ts because courts "have 
always r e s i s t ed inquiring in to a j u r y s thought process [and] . . 
. through t h i s the jury brings to the criminal process, in 
addition to the co l lec t ive judgment of the community, an element 
of f i n a l i t y . " United S ta tes v. Powell, U.^. , 105 S.Ct. 
471, 478 (1984) . 
Courts also uphold inconsis tent ve rd i c t s , because such 
ve rd ic t s are often a product of the j u r y ' s not-entirely-improper 
des i re for l en i ty toward the defendant. The Supreme Court s tated 
in Powell: 
The burden of the exercise of l en i ty f a l l s 
only on the Government, and i t has been 
suggested tha t such an a l t e rna t i ve should 
be avai lable for the d i f f i cu l t cases where 
the jury wishes to avoid an a l l -o r -no th ing 
ve rd i c t . Such an act i s , as the Dunn 
Court recognized, an "assumption of 3 
power which [the jury has] no r ight t|o 
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exerc iser" but the i l l e g a l i t y alone does 
not mean that such a co l l ec t ive judgment 
should be subject to review. The fact 
tha t the inconsistency may be the r e su l t 
of l e n i t y , coupled with the Government's 
i n a b i l i t y t o invoke review, suggest that 
inconsis tent ve rd ic t s should not be re -
viewable. 
105 S.Ct. 477 (c i t a t ion and footnote omit ted) . See also State v. 
Christensen, Utah, no. 20641, s l i p op. a t 3 (October 17, 1986) (a 
j u r y ' s acqu i t t a l of a defendant may resu l t from some compromise, 
mistake, or l en i ty on the j u r y ' s p a r t ) . 
The record of the proceedings below suggest tha t the 
present case very probably involved the type of l en i ty discussed 
by the Supreme Court in Powell. Here, the evidence was 
compelling that defendant had the r equ i s i t e i n t e n t , and was 
gui l ty or, actual the f t . K.C. Coombs t e s t i f i e d t ha t he and 
defendant conspired to take the Esplin c a t t l e without permission 
of the owner (R. 77-«4) . There was persuasive evidence tha t 
defendant could not possibly have been ignorant of the fact tha t 
the taking was unauthorized: he and Coombs had been to the 
Esplin cor ra l s on the very day they took the c a t t l e and had seen 
Mr. Esplin herding the c a t t l e (R. 78, 156); the c a t t l e were taken 
in the middle of the night (R. 80, 163); the two men followed 
deserted back roads on t h e i r way to Cedar City (R. 81 , 162-63); 
and they s to l e another cow tha t had been running loose in the 
auction yard (R. 85, S t a t e ' s exh ib i t s 8-10). Nevertheless, i t 
seems clear from the record that Mr. Coombs was the leader in the 
scheme and the more culpable of the two men; t h a t defendant was a 
follower who would not l ike ly have engaged in such criminal 
a c t i v i t y of his own accord. Further, Mr. Coombs took the money 
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from the sa le and gave defendant only $250.00. There i s a very 
real l ikel ihood that the jury members f e l t compassion toward 
defendant and, in the words of Jus t ice Holmes, assumed a 
pardoning "power which they had no right to exerc ise , but t o 
which they were disposed through l e n i t y . " Dunn # 284 U.S. at 393. 
In rendering i t s ve rd ic t , the jury c lear ly found every element of 
the crime of attempted the f t , including the r equ i s i t e in tent to 
s t e a l (see R. 83-86, ins t ruc t ing the ju ry , i n t e r a l i a , that the 
Sta te has "the buraen of proving each and a l l of the essen t ia l 
a l lega t ions in each separate count . " ) . Defendant, never theless , 
endeavors to persuade t h i s Court that the jury did not rea l ly 
find that he had the in tent to s t e a l . He argues tha t , by 
acqui t t ing him of actual thef t , the jury must have found t ha t he 
did not have the in tent to s tea l and, therefore , the jury must 
have concluded tha t he did not have the required in tent to 
support a conviction of attempted the f t . In Powell, the Supreme 
Court rejected a similar argument and explained the fal lacy of 
this roundabout reasoning: 
Second, respondent 's argument tha t an ac -
q u i t t a l on a predicate offense necess i t a t es 
a finding of insuff ic ient evidence on a 
compound felony count simply misunderstands 
the nature of the inconsis tent verdict 
problem. Whether presented as an in su f f i -
cient evidence argument, or as an argument 
that the acqu i t t a l on the predicate offense 
should c o l l a t e r a l l y estop the Government on 
the compound offense, the argument neces-
sa r i l y assumes tha t the acqui t ta l on the 
predicate offense was proper—the one the jury "real ly meant." This, of course, i s 
not necessari ly cor rec t ; a l l we know i s 
t ha t the ve rd ic t s are incons i s ten t . The 
Government could j u s t as easily—and 
erroneously—argue tha t since the jury con-
victed on the compound offense the evidence 
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on t h e p r e d i c a t e offense must have been 
s u f f i c i e n t . The problem i s t h a t the same 
j u ry reached i n c o n s i s t e n t r e s u l t s ; once 
t h a t i s e s t a b l i s h e d p r i n c i p l e s of c o l l a t e r a l 
es toppel—which a re p r e d i c a t e d on t h e a s -
sumption t h a t t he ju ry ac t ed r a t i o n a l l y and 
found c e r t a i n f a c t s in reaching i t s v e r d i c t 
—are no longer useful* 
105 S.Ct. a t 47d-79 . The S t a t e has n e i t h e r t he l e g a l means nor 
t h e i n c l i n a t i o n t o cha l l enge the j u r y ' s e x e r c i s e of l e n i t y in t he 
p re sen t c a s e . The S t a t e does, however, urge t h a t defendant 
should not now be heard to complain t h a t h i s conv ic t i ons for the 
l e s s e r inc luded offense of at tempt should be reversed on grounds 
t h a t t he ju ry behaved i r r a t i o n a l l y . 
As noted in S t e w a r t , 33 Utah Adv. Rep. a t 1 5 , t h e r e a l 
i s s u e i s whether the evidence suppor ted t he j u r y ' s v e r d i c t . By 
examining t h e record t o a s s u r e t h a t t h e evidence i s s u f f i c i e n t t o 
convic t the defendant , a p p e l l a t e c o u r t s adequa te ly p r o t e c t the 
accused a g a i n s t i r r a t i o n a l v e r d i c t s . The Supreme Court dec la red 
in Powell : 
F i n a l l y , we note t h a t a c r iminal defendant 
a l ready i s afforded p r o t e c t i o n a g a i n s t 
j u ry i r r a t i o n a l i t y or e r ro r by t h e i n d e -
pendent review of the s u f f i c i e n c y of t he 
evidence undertaken by t h e t r i a l and ap-
p e l l a t e c o u r t s . 
105 S.Ct. a t 47«. The record evidence c i t e d in t h e s ta tement of 
f a c t s t o t h i s b r i e f , supra a t 1, e s t a b l i s h e s t h a t t h e r e was 
adequate evidence t o support d e f e n d a n t ' s conv ic t i on of a t tempted 
t h e f t . Defendant ' s conv ic t ion should be af f i rmed. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon t h e foregoing arguments , defendants 
conv ic t i on should be af f i rmed. 
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You are instructed that in every consummated offense 
there must of necessity exist an attempt to commit the offense. 
Stated another way, a person is guilty of an attempt to commit 
a crime if, acting with the culpability otherwise required for 
the commission of the offense, he engages in conduct constituting 
a substantial step toward the commission of the offense, he may 
be guilty of making an attempt to commit such offense. 
Stated another way, if a person with the mental state 
required takes some action of a substantial nature to carry out 
the offense charged but is not successful in carrying out the 
offense to its completion, then, in that event, you may find 
such person guilty of an attempted crime, keeping in mind, 
however, that to sustain a conviction of any offense the 
evidence must bear, in your minds, the convincing force required 
by law. 
You are further instructed that an attempt to commit a 
crime, as above defined, is a lesser but included offense in 
the charged crime. 
M 
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